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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(2004) and Rules 3,4, and 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in relying on certain maps that it located through its own

research, and that were not introduced as evidence at trial?
Standard of Review: The issue of whether it was legal error for the trial court to rely
on certain maps that it located through its own research, and that were not introduced at trial,
is a legal issue that is reviewed for correctness. See Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT
16,19, 70 P.3d 47; State ex rel. A.C.C.. 2002 UT 22, f 12, 44 P.3d 708.
2.

Did the trial court err in allowing Randall to obliterate the historic water

delivery system, including the total destruction of the holding pond and the ditches that
delivered water to White's property, and in substituting an alternative system crafted by the
trial court?
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. See Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). Its
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994).
3.

Does Utah law allow a recovery of attorney's fees and costs as an element of

a punitive damage award?

1

Standard of Review: The issue of whether attorney's fees and costs may be recovered
under Utah law as an element of a punitive damage award is a legal issue that is reviewed for
correctness. See Bradley v. Pavson Citv Corp., 2003 UT 16, f 9, 70 P.3d 47; State ex rel.
A.C.C.. 2002 UT 22, f 12,44 P.3d 708.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Leon J. White ("White") filed this lawsuit on August 29,2003, requesting
that appellee Jerry Randall ("Randall") be required to restore the pond and ditches destroyed
by him, and that he be enjoined from threatening to shoot White or members of White's
family and from shooting animals. White also asked for an award of punitive damages (R.
at 1-5).
At a hearing on White's Motion for an Order to Show Cause on September 24,2003,
the trial court did not have time to take testimony and instead set the case for trial (R. at 31,
272). The trial commenced on October 9,2003, and was concluded on November 26,2003
(R. at 36-37, 41-46, 269-270), at which time the trial court heard arguments of counsel and
made preliminary findings with respect only to the foal and the alleged loss of chickens (R.
at 45).
The trial court requested that counsel submit proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law by January 23, 2004 (R. at 45). Due to problems getting copies of the
CD's and audio tapes from the Clerk's office that were ordered by both counsel, White's

2

counsel requested two extensions and submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on March 5, 2004 (R. at 53-64, 65-77).
Randall filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, which White opposed (R. at 78-99). More than six months later, on September 14,
2004, the trial court, having been provided an unofficial transcript of the trial, and having
listened to the trial testimony, approved and entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law submitted by White (R. at 105-115). On September 30, 2004, the trial court entered
the Judgment submitted by White notwithstanding Randall's Objection to the Proposed
Judgment, a Second Motion to Strike Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Third
Motion to Alter, Amend or Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that had
been filed on September 27, 2004 by Randall (R. at 117-155).
Almost six months later, following inquiries to the Clerk's office, at a further hearing
on April 4,2005, the case was again argued to the trial court and additional documents were
requested by the court (R. at 229-231).
On July 26, 2005, Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered
by the trial court and on September 19,2005, a Judgment was entered, neither of which were
consistent with prior rulings of the trial court (R. at 238-247, 254-56).
White filed his Notice of Appeal on October 13, 2005 (R. at 262-63).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
White's Purchase of Land and Water Rights
1.

In July 1995, appellant Leon J. White purchased a 16-acre parcel of land

together with an existing well and one share of stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company
("Irrigation Company") from Kaziah May Hancock ("Hancock") and her husband Ivan
Douglas Hancock (R. at 269, pp. 6-8).
2.

In early November 1995, some three months later, White purchased from the

Hancocks an additional 10-acre parcel together with an additional 10 shares of stock in the
Indianola Irrigation Company (R. at 269, p. 9).
3.

The acquired parcels consisted of flat irrigated farmland and a hill located in

the northeast comer upon which White intended to, and later did, build a home (R. at 269,
pp. 9-10).
Hancock's Purchase and Use of the Property
4.

The land and water rights held by Hancock at the time of the sale to White in

1995, including those sold to White, were purchased by her in 1988. Following acquisition
of the land and water rights, she built a log home on the hill and devoted the balance to
farming and livestock grazing (R. at 269, pp. 81-82).
Water Delivery System to White Property
5.

A pond was located on the 11-acre parcel still owned by Hancock (the "Pond")

after the sale to White. The Pond had been used by Hancock and her predecessor's lessee,
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Don Tibbs ("Tibbs"), for collection of spring runoff and to collect and deliver water that
came through an existing ditch from the Irrigation Company system upstream for
downstream irrigation of adjacent crop land, including the property later sold to White (R.
at 269, pp. 10-11,447-48). The Pond had been destroyed by floods that overran the property
in the summer of 1983 and was reconstructed and enlarged by Tibbs in the 1983-85 time
period with a grant from the U.S. Soil Conservation Service (R. at 269, pp. 191-92).
6.

Following its enlargement, the Pond dike reached a height of 10-12 feet and

was equipped with a pipe outlet which featured a valve to control the outflow from the Pond
(R. at 269, pp. 192-93). After exiting the Pond, the water entered a ditch that delivered the
water in a westerly direction to the property sold to White and then around the base of the hill
on that property to flood irrigate the flat crop land that extended on west to U.S. Highway 89
(R. at 269, p. 10).
7.

At the time of the sale to White, he and Hancock walked the property and she

showed him how the irrigation system worked; how the water came through a ditch to the
Pond and then flowed in another ditch from the Pond to the White property. Hancock
assured White that he would be able to continue to enjoy the permanent system of the ditches
and the Pond to get water to his property, just the same as she had used them since 1988 and
the same as they had been used before that (R. at 269, pp. 13-16). In fact, in 1988, Don
Tibbs showed Hancock how the system worked; how to get water from the Pond to the
Condley land that she later conveyed to White (R. at 269, p. 105).
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8.

Hancock and White understood and agreed that he was to have a permanent

easement in the existing system of ditches and the Pond to receive, store and use his water
(R. at 269, pp. 13-16, 96-97,452-53).
9.

That system, which had been in existence and in use for a number of years

before 1988 (R. at 13), was not changed during her ownership and was unchanged when
White received title to his property and thereafter (R. at 269, pp. 105, 447-48).
10.

White and Hancock both testified that there was no other means of delivery of

water to the White property (R. at 269, pp. 17, 447-48).
11.

Based upon this understanding and agreement the sale was closed and White

began at that time and thereafter to take his water through that system, which remained
unchanged, to flood irrigate his crop land, and he continued to do so until Randall destroyed
the Pond in July of 2003 (R. at 269, pp. 12-13,16-18).
12.

In 1998, Hancock sold the remaining 11-acre parcel with the home and a

culinary well right to Randall (R. at 269, pp. 18-19). Randall purchased no stock in the
Irrigation Company and, other than the well permit, has never owned any other water rights
(R. at 269, p. 361).
13.

According to Hancock, she advised Randall or his real estate agent at the time

of the sale to him of the then ongoing use by White of the irrigation system. She testified
that, in response to an objection by Randall that the Pond was of no benefit to him, she
reduced the purchase price from $130,000 to $125,000 (R. at 269, pp. 448-450).
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14.

Randall walked the property when he bought it, walked around the Pond, saw

that the water discharged from the Pond into a ditch that "went down to the White place" and
"around the brow of the hill.-.. toward the northwest... the same one that's there today .
. . the one that he's [White's] used to irrigate the property to the west"
(R. at 269, pp. 366-67).
Randall's Interference with White's Water Rights
15.

In the two or three-year period prior to 2003, White would at times find that

the water was not flowing from the Pond because someone had shut off the valve. When this
occurred, White would go to the Pond and open the valve. This interruption of the flow
became more frequent in the 2002 and 2003 period (R. at 269, p. 19).
16.

In the early 2000 period, White "noticed a new ditch being dug around the

pond" (R. at 269, pp. 20-21). Upon making inquiry to Randall, White was told, "That's the
ditch we was going to have to start taking our water from." White responded by stating that
"[i]t's illegal to try to change any ditches or the way water comes without getting
authorization from everybody down below you" (Id.). White tried to be polite and tried to
talk to Randall about this in a peaceful manner but Randall became angry and told White that
he was not going to store White's "blankety blank water" (Id.). White refused to change his
water delivery and continued to use the Pond and the ditches to and from the Pond just as he
and as Hancock and Tibbs had used them before.

7

17.

In May of 2003, White again found the flow had stopped again and upon

inspecting the valve found that it had been turned off and that a lock had been installed to
prevent the valve from being opened (R. at 269, p. 21). White testified:
A.
So I — we undid the locks and that, and we're taking the valves off so he
can't sit there and keep turning them off,... because I'm the only one that should be
getting the water, because I had the shares of water and not him. So I - we was taking
the valves off, and all of a sudden he comes down.
Q.

Now, did he have any water shares?

A.

Mr. Randall didn't have any water shares, irrigation water shares.

Q.

Okay, go ahead.

A.
So Mr. Randall come down, and he starts confronting us about that, and
telling us to get off of his property and that. I told him at that time, I says, "You know,
this is the irrigation ditch. You know, we have - there's a right-of-way through here that
we, you know, take our water and get our water. We have that right. Why would you
lock the gate?
*

He *

. . . because I had no other way to get my water.
So he indicated to me then - again he told me he ain't gonna store my water and
that. We talked about a few other things, you know, because I - I tried to calm h i m , . . . .
* * *

He didn't want to talk about stuff. Like he turned to my boy, and he goes, "And
this little son-of-a - " to my boy - "shot at me." To me, when he brought that up, because
there was nothing - there was no reason for me to bring that up. I think he was trying to
get me, you know, mad or something. To call my boy that and in front of me, was a very
insult and that.
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I said to him, "Jerry, he wasn't even the one over in the field, you know, shooting,"
you know, that he was indicating that they was shooting in the field and shot at him. He
wasn' t even the one.l
So that confrontation got over; and he started to go up the hill and that. Then he
turned and told - and said to me the next time I'd be talking to him, he'd be talking to me
with a gun. I said to him, "So you're threatening to shoot me?" He goes, "No, I'm not
threatening to shoot. I'm telling you I'm going to return fire."
I goes, "I've never done nothing to you. I've never done a thing to you. I've never
shot at you." I've never tried to do anything, tried to make his life miserable in any way.
So me and my boy, we left, and about a week later - well, he did threaten me right
then and there, too, that he was going to not store my water anymore. He was going to
tear (inaudible) the pond out.
(R. at 269, pp. 22-24). This testimony was not disputed by Randall.
18.

White again continued to take his water turn in the same way as before (R. at

269, p. 24).
19.

On July 3, 2003, without further discussion with or notice to White, a

contractor employed by Randall leveled and obliterated the Pond and the ditch (R24-25),
thereby destroying White's only means of receiving, storing or using his water rights. As a
result, he was unable to irrigate his crop lands for the balance of the 2003 season or the 2004
and 2005 seasons (R. at 269, pp. 24-26).
The Alleged Shooting Incident
20.

Randall alleged that White's son fired a gun at him (R. at 269, pp. 135).

1

White' s son was not even in the area when the supposed shot was fired (R. at 269,
pp. 136-37).
9

21.

On December 2,2002, Sanpete County Deputy Sheriff Gary Larsen was called

by Randall to investigate a claim that he had been shot at and he had "heard a round go over
his head." Randall believed "it was Mr. White's son" who had shot the round (R. at 269, pp.
151-54).
22.

Larsen measured only part way ("over 1000 feet") to where the shots had been

fired, which from where he measured, "was still quite a ways out." He testified that the shots
were taken far beyond 600 feet, the distance from any residence that a firearm cannot be
discharged under state law (R. at 269, pp. 154).
23.

The second witness called by Randall to support his claim was a supposed

expert, Rick Allshouse, who claimed to have been at Randall's home and heard the shot go
by (R. at 269, p. 259). He gave his opinion that the shot was made from a distance of
800-900 yards (2,400-2,700 feet) by a .22 caliber rifle and that the round could have
ricocheted off an object before going over his head (R. at 269, p. 259-260, 262, 264). He
further testified that he could tell the bullet was "tumbling" as it went by within 15 or 20 feet
(R. at 269, p. 270). His claim that the gun used was a .22 caliber rifle was based solely on
his observation through binoculars from the distance of some 900 yards (R. at 269, p. 26566). He never saw or ever asked to actually see the firearm involved or to talk to the boys
involved (Id.). Neither of the boys involved in this alleged incident were the boy that Randall
confronted and accused at the Pond.
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24.

The gun involved was actually a 12-gauge shotgun in the hands of White's

son-in-law, Sam Gonzales, who was hunting rabbits with a friend two fields away from the
Randall residence (R. at 269, p. 139).
Randall Shot Dogs Owned by the White Family and Neighbors
25.

Deputy Larsen was called on May 10,2001, by White because his dog had been

shot in the stomach by Pamela Randall, appellee's wife, two days earlier. He talked to Mrs.
Randall who claimed the dog had one of her chickens down so she shot a .22 rifle to scare
it but apparently hit it instead. No claim was made that the dog had killed the chicken or that
she had let the Whites know about it (R. at 269, pp. 156-57).
Allegations Involving White's Dog
26.

Randall claimed that White's dog had killed a colt sometime earlier, and more

than 50 chickens in the 2002 time period. On cross examination, however, Randall testified
with respect to the colt that he "assumed" White's dog killed the colt because he had seen
it in the corral with the horses in the early morning and "there was quite a bit of confusion"
and the colt was "sweated up and lathered up" (R. at 270, pp. 310-11). Randall claimed that
later in the afternoon he saw the same dog back in the corral standing over the dying colt (R.
at 270, p. 314).
27.

Randall testified that he "then went down and confronted Mr. White in regards

to the dog chasing the fold [foal] to death," but then backtracked by stating that "I've got to
put that on the telephone. I don't remember having gone down and talked face to face." (R.
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at 270, pp. 314-15). White told him the foal wasn't killed by his dog, that he had been
outside working in the field and yard all day and the dog had been right there by his side all
the time, never left his side." Randall then told White "Okay, if that dog comes back on my
property, I will shoot it for what it had done to the fold [foal]." (Id.). "I [Randall] told him
that I would kill any of the dogs that was threatening and killing my animals" (R. at 270, p.
360).
28.

Randall was aware that there were other dogs in the neighborhood and testified

that he owned two other dogs at that time (R. at 270, p. 357). He admitted that he did not see
White's dog between early morning and his finding the dying foal at the end of the day, did
not hear any more barking all day, did not see the dog chase the foal again, did not have the
foal examined, took no photos of the dead foal, saw no teeth marks on it, did not see the foal
killed, nor did anyone else, and did not report it to the sheriff. He produced no other
evidence to show what caused the foal's death (R. at 270, pp. 359-360, 368-69).
29.

With respect to the chickens, Randall testified, as noted above, that his wife

claimed she saw that White's dog had a chicken down, but did not kill it. Otherwise he
admitted on cross examination he made no claim relating to the supposed killing of his
chickens before this case was filed over a year later, he took no photos, did not discuss any
of the supposed dozens of killed chickens with White, knew of no witnesses to any chicken
being killed, saw no other chicken being attacked or killed and never called the sheriff as to
any further problems (R. at 270, pp. 371-72).
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30.

White filed this lawsuit on August 29, 2003 (R. at 262-63).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

When White filed this lawsuit on August 29, 2003, all he wanted was to be restored
back to the position he was in before Randall unlawfully obliterated his water delivery
system. Two and a half years later, and after spending thousands of dollars on legal fees and
court costs, White is still without the benefit of his water delivery system.
The Judgment that the trial court entered in this case must be reversed because the trial
court committed the following critical errors:
First, the trial court violated the fundamental rule of law that neither a judge nor a jury
is permitted to go outside of the evidence presented at trial to make a finding. See Salt Lake
Citv v. United Park City Mines Co.. 503 P.2d 850 (Utah 1972). The trial court's actions in
researching, locating, modifying and relying upon certain maps that it located through its own
independent research, and that were not introduced into evidence at trial, constitutes legal
error.
Second, the trial court correctly found that White had an easement across Randall's
land. However, the trial court erred when it considered and relied upon certain maps that it
located through its own research, and that were not presented at trial, to craft an alternate
water delivery system. If White was entitled to an easement by implication pursuant to
Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264 Utah (1947), then the trial court should have granted
White an easement in the entire water delivery system as it existed historically. It was legal
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error for the trial court to exclude the Pond and other aspects of the historic water delivery
system.
For these reasons, the Judgment of the trial court must be reversed and the Court
should instruct the trial court to enter judgment consistent with its initial Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law, which required Randall to pay the costs of restoring the water delivery
system.

Additionally, as part of its decision remanding the case, the Court should

affirmatively instruct the trial court that it should award White his attorney's fees and costs
as an element of punitive damages, because punitive damages are warranted.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON CERTAIN MAPS THAT
IT LOCATED THROUGH ITS OWN INDEPENDENT RESEARCH, AND
THAT WERE NOT INTRODUCED AS EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.
In its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated July 21,2005, the trial

court relied on certain maps that it located through its own independent research, and that
were not introduced into evidence at trial (R. at 238-247) . The trial court's actions in
considering and relying on those maps was in direct conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Co.. 503 P.2d 850 (Utah 1972), and
constitutes legal error.
Following the trial in this matter, the trial court scheduled a hearing on the parties'
motions to amend the Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. During that
April 4,2005 hearing, Judge Mower showed counsel certain USGS topographical maps that
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he had located through his own independent research. Judge Mower took two of those maps,
attached them together and drew the relevant parcels of land on the maps based on the legal
descriptions.2 (R. at 273, pp. 2-12).
The maps used by the trial court were not introduced as evidence at trial, were not part
of the record in the case, and the parties did not have an opportunity to effectively review or
respond to them. Rather, they were maps that the trial court found and modified as part of
its own independent research following trial. Neither of the parties stipulated to the
admission of such maps, and the trial court's sua sponte discussion of the maps during the
April 4th hearing did not result in them becoming part of the trial record.3 In fact, the trial
court went so far as to acknowledge that it was violating the rule of law that neither a judge
nor a jury is permitted to go outside of the evidence presented at trial to make a finding of
fact. After first showing the maps to counsel, Judge Mower stated as follows:
The lawyers and I have been around long enough that we've tried a few jury
trial[s], and we all remember that jury instruction that says, "Make sure
your decision is based only on the evidence, and don't look for information
in law books, dictionaries, or other sources of information that are not
presented to the Court."

2

Judge Mower noted that the mapping software he used "gives lots of disclaimers
saying, 'Don't settle your lawsuits based on what you draw on these maps.'" (R. at 273,
pp. 8-9). Nevertheless, Judge Mower did just that and relied on the mapping software's
representation of the properties based on the legal descriptions.
3

During the April 4, 2005 hearing, the parties did stipulate to supplement the
record with a relevant trust deed that was not entered into evidence at trial. (R. at 273, pp.
110-11). In stark contrast, the parties did not stipulate to the admission of the trial court's
USGS topographical maps.
15

Pm here to tell vou that I have violated that instruction. I have looked
for things in places that are not presented in Court about this case: and
I want to tell you what Y ve looked at. I think we are going to be okay and I
think my explanation is going to be helpful. At least it was for me, but I
want to tell you what I've looked at.
(R. at 273, p. 3) (emphasis added).
Then on July 21, 2005, the trial court issued it's Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, which were entirely inconsistent with the trial court's prior rulings. In
its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court relied heavily on the
maps that it presented during the April 4th hearing. The Amended Findings of Fact provide
in relevant part as follows:
3.

The United States Geologic Survey publishes maps. The maps used
here are portions of two USGS 7-1/2-minute quadrangle maps which
have been "stitched" together to make a single map. USGS 7-1/2minute maps contain contour lines and locations of water sources,
courses and storage facilities, both natural and man-made. The
maps used here were not presented bv the parties. They are part
of mv own mapping software, I used the maps to help
familiarize myself with the area, I showed the maps to counsel
during oral argument on April 4. 2005,
* * *

5.

I have modified the above map bv highlighting the contour lines.

6.

There is a pond of particular interest in this case. It is highlighted in
blue on this m a p . . . .
# * *

10.

Here is a map showing the pond, the contour lines, and the property
owned by White and Randall.
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* * *

12.

The only way water can possibly flow from the pond onto the NE
corner of White's property is for it [to] flow below the 5,940 contour
line and above the 5,920 contour line.

a.

These contour lines are very close together in the vicinity of
the residences on [stet] the parties.
i.

The White home is just below the 5,920-foot contour
line.

ii.

The Randall home is on a hill just above the 5,940-foot
contour line.

* * *

18.

It should be physically and geographically possible for water to
flow across Mr. Randall's property and onto Mr. White's property.

(R. at 238-245) (emphasis added). It should be noted that the trial court's Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law contain seven different images of maps from the trial court's
mapping software. Counsel for White is not even sure if these are the same maps that the
Court showed the parties during the April 4th hearing.
The trial court violated the fundamental rule of law that neither a judge nor a jury is
permitted to go outside of the evidence presented at trial to make a finding. The trial court's
actions in researching, locating, modifying and relying upon such maps constitutes legal
error.
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In Salt Lake City v. United Park Citv Mines Co.. 503 P.2d 850 (Utah 1972), the Utah
Supreme Court reversed a decision by a district court judge who did exactly what Judge
Mower did in this case. In that case, Salt Lake City brought suit to quiet title to the flow of
water from a tunnel which had been constructed by the defendant and which the City
contended diminished creek flow, most of which was owned by the City. On appeal, the
Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court's use of information outside of the evidence
presented at trial to reject evidence presented at trial was improper and necessitated a new
trial upon all issues. The court described the trial court's improprieties as follows:
Had the court based his ruling upon the evidence before him, we do not
know what the judgment might have been. However, instead of confining
himself to the testimony and exhibits given in evidence, he used a book not
in evidence, by the use of which he made for his own consideration nine
exhibits which were never seen by counsel at trial, and then by the use of a
computer at the University of Utah, operated by a student whose skill in
programming was, and is, unknown, arrived at what he called a "proper
slope" which he says is at variance with that used by the City in calculating
the base line of a double mass curve used to compare variance in
comparative stream flows.
The computer gave the judge a slope not in accord with the evidence given
by the experts; yet he used this slope to decide that the exhibits of the City
were in error and, therefore, the City had not sustained its burden of
showing an unnatural decrease in the flow of the waters of Big Cottonwood
Creek since the driving of the Spiro Tunnel. By making this determination,
the court did not feel required to consider the other issues reserved for trial.
Id. at 852. The court went on to state that "[i]n deciding a case tried without the aid of a jury,
the court has great leeway in deciding what are the facts as presented by the evidence before
him. However, neither a judge nor a jury is permitted to go outside the evidence to
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make a finding." Id. (emphasis added). See also Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v.
Carlson, 133 P.2d 777, 782 (Utah 1943) ("The purpose of a trial of the issues is to have the
facts determined impartially and fairly by a court or jury. Jurors as well as judges must base
their verdicts or decisions on the evidence presented during the trial not on the basis of some
independent personal investigation or determination of the facts outside of court.").
The Utah Supreme Court then noted that the trial court's error was so egregious in that
the case that would be unfair to simply remand the case for further proceedings:
In view of the fact that we have found it necessary to reverse the findings
and judgment because of impropriety of the methods used as discussed
herein, we can appreciate that the appellant City, as the losing party who
was obliged to take this appeal and obtain the reversal, may have
apprehensions about a fair and impartial determination if the case were
simply remanded for further consideration.
Id.
In this case, the trial court committed the very legal error addressed by the Utah
Supreme Court in Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Co..5Q3 P.2d 850 (Utah 1972).
The trial court conducted its own independent research and relied on maps that were not
introduced at trial to craft an entirely new water delivery system. Moreover, the trial court's
Finding that "[i]t should be physically and geographically possible for water to flow across
Mr. Randall's property and onto Mr. White's property" by way of a new ditch crafted by the
trial court (R. at 245) is in direct conflict with the unrebutted trial testimony of both White
and Hancock that there was no other means to deliver water to the White property other than
the system that Randall obliterated (R. at 269, pp. 17, 447-48). Therefore, the trial court's
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Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, which fundamentally rely
on Judge Mower's personal maps, must not be considered.
Accordingly, the Court should set aside the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and instruct the trial court to enter judgment
consistent with its initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which ordered Randall
to pay the costs to restore the Pond and water delivery system back to their original condition.
In the alternative, the case should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial on all issues.
In the event that the case is remanded for new trial, White respectfully requests that the case
be assigned to a different trial judge so that he can obtain a fair and impartial trial.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SUBSTITUTING AN ALTERNATIVE
WATER DELIVERY SYSTEM CRAFTED BY THE COURT IN THE
PLACE OF THE HISTORIC WATER DELIVERY SYSTEM, WHICH
INCLUDED THE HOLDING POND AND THE DITCHES THAT
DELIVERED WATER TO THE POND AND WHITES PROPERTY.
When White filed this lawsuit, all he wanted was to be put back into the position he

was in before Randall willfully and maliciously destroyed the water delivery system. In its
initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court did just that-it ordered
Randall to pay the costs to restore the Pond and water delivery system back to their original
condition. The trial court initially reached the following legal conclusions:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
White holds a valid easement for the use and enjoyment of the
System across Randall's property for the conveyance, storage and delivery
of his water rights as heretofore used and enjoyed by Jordan and by him.
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2.
Randall had and has no right to obstruct or change the System
"without first receiving written permission for the change" from White.
U.C.A. § 73-1-15 (1953). No such permission was ever requested or
received.
3.
Randall is charged with notice and knowledge of the System
and White's right to the use and enjoyment thereof as heretofore enjoyed.
* * *

5.
Randall is obligated to pay the cost of restoration of the pond
and the System to their condition at the time they were destroyed and/or
rendered useless.
(R. at 133-14). These initial legal conclusions were supported by the underlying facts and
the relevant law, and would have restored White back into the position he was in before
Randall obliterated the water delivery system. The trial court, however, subsequently
reversed course and amended its Findings and Conclusions.
In its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated July 21,2005, the trial
court backed away from its initial ruling, which ordered White to "pay the cost of restoration
of the pond and the System to their condition at the time they were destroyed and/or rendered
useless." Instead, the trial court relied on certain maps that it located through its own
independent research, and that were not introduced into evidence at trial, to craft an entirely
new water delivery system, which did not include the original Pond. As shown above, it was
legal error for the trial court to consider and rely on those materials in the first place.
Additionally, the trial court's decision to craft an alternative water delivery system deprived
White of the right he had to use and enjoy the historical water delivery system.
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In its amended decision, the trial court relied on the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in Adamson v. Brockbank. 185 P.2d 264 Utah (1947), to grant White an easement across
White's property (R. at 246-47). However, the trial court's ruling only included a rerouted
easement for a ditch. The Court did not include an easement for the entire water delivery
system, including the Pond that Randall had destroyed. See id. It was an error for the trial
court to find that White was entitled to an easement but to limit that easement to a simple
ditch that was not the same water delivery system that White and his predecessors had used
historically.
In Adamson v. Brockbank. supra, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court's
decision finding that the plaintiffs had the right to the use of a ditch that the defendants had
destroyed while subdividing their property. See id. at 269-274. The facts in the Brockbank
case were quite similar to those in this case. The irrigation ditch in question in Brockbank
had existed and been in use for nearly 30 years prior to the time that the property was divided
and sold to the litigants. See id. at 269. The original owner of the land, severed the
properties and sold them to different buyers without mentioning a right of way or easement
in the deeds. See id. There was evidence that both parties were aware of the existence and
necessity of the ditch prior to purchasing their respective properties. See id. Sometime later,
the defendants destroyed the ditch and prevented the plaintiffs from bringing water through
the ditch to their property. See id. Based on these facts, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's finding of an easement.
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The Utah Supreme Court considered the following factors in finding an easement by
implication:
(a) Whether the claimant is the conveyor or the conveyee,
(b) The terms of the conveyance,
(c) The consideration given for it,
(d) Whether the claim is made against a simultaneous conveyee,
(e) The extent of necessity of the easement to the claimant,
(f) Whether reciprocal benefits result to the conveyor and the conveyee,
(g) The manner in which the land was used prior to its conveyance,
(h) The extent to which the manner of prior use was or might have been
known to the parties.
See id- at 270-71. A careful review of these factors in light of the facts of this case
demonstrates that the trial court was correct in finding an easement by implication in favor
of White.
First, White is a conveyee and therefore any doubts in construing the conveyance
should be resolved in his favor. Second, although the deed may not reflect an express
easement, the evidence is undisputed that prior to purchasing the property, Hancock showed
White how the water delivery system worked and assured White that he would be able to
continue to enjoy the permanent system of the ditches and the Pond to get water to his
property, just the same as she had used them since 1988 and the same as they had been used
before that (R. at 269, pp. 13-16). Hancock and White understood and agreed that White was
to have a permanent easement in the existing system of ditches and the Pond to receive, store
and use his water (R. at 269, pp. 13-16,96-97,452-53). Third, White paid Hancock fair and
adequate consideration for the property he purchased, which included a right to use the
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historic water delivery system. White's property is of little or no value without water and the
ability to properly receive, store and use that water. See supra. Fourth, it is important to note
that White purchased his property, including the right to use the water delivery system,
approximately three years before Randall purchased his property from Hancock (R. at 269,
pp. 9-10, 18-19). Fifth, the use of the historical water delivery system was reasonably
necessary, and in fact essential, in order for White to use his land for the purpose for which
it was purchased. Both White and Hancock testified that there was no other means to deliver
water to the White property other than the system that Randall obliterated (R. at 269, pp. 17,
447-48). Sixth, White's use of the land and the water delivery system is wholly consistent
with the use made by the land's prior owners, including Hancock (R. at 269, pp. 10-18, 8182, 105, 447-48). Finally, there is undisputed evidence that Randall was not only aware of
White's use of the water delivery system at the time Randall purchased his property, but that
he actually received a $5,000 reduction in the purchase price to compensate him for White's
use of the system (R. at 269, pp. 18-19, 366-67, 448-450).
In this case, the relevant factors overwhelmingly suggest that White has an easement
by implication in the historical water delivery system. However, the Court erred limiting that
easement to a rerouted ditch across Randall's land. If White was entitled to an easement by
implication pursuant to Adamson v. Brockbank. 185 P.2d 264 Utah (1947), then the trial
court should have granted White an easement in the entire water delivery system as it existed
historically. It was legal error for the trial court to exclude the Pond and other critical aspects
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of the historic water delivery system. This is especially true given that the Court went
outside the evidence presented at trial and relied on its own topographical maps in order to
craft an entirely new water delivery system. If White was entitled to an easement, then it had
to be an easement for the water delivery system as it existed and was used historically. This
is especially true given that White and Hancock both testified that there was no other means
to deliver water to the White property (R. at 269, pp. 17, 447-48).
The Pond was a critical component of the historic water delivery system. The Pond
allowed White to receive and store his irrigation water until he needed it (R. at 269, pp. 1112). White testified that he could close the gate on the Pond and store his water, building up
a four day supply. This is vastly different than the simple ditch ordered by the trial court that
provides no storage and requires White to take his water when it is available. The Pond also
allowed White to gather and store spring runoff and natural seepage that flowed into the
Pond (R. at 269, pp. 10-11, 48-49, 447-48). Despite these key facts, the trial court limited
the easement to a ditch across Randall's land and excluded the Pond from its amended
decision.
The trial court appears to have relied on the fact that White presented no evidence
concerning what it would cost to restore the Pond, nor any detailed evidence concerning the
exact dimensions of the Pond, as a basis to exclude the restoration of the Pond from its
decision (R. at 245). Nevertheless, counsel for White explained during oral argument that
those details could easily be supplemented after the trial court entered its judgment (R. at
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273, pp. 45-46). Moreover, White should not be punished or prejudiced by the fact that he
did not think to take exact measurements of the Pond prior to Randall's unilateral decision
to obliterate it. White is entitled to have the Pond restored to its original condition,, or as
close to that original condition as possible.
Finally, Randall violated Utah law by unilaterally obliterating the historical water
delivery system relied upon by White. Section 73-1-14 provided as follows:
Any person, who in any way unlawfully interferes with, injures, destroys or
removes any dam, head gate, weir, casing, valve, cap or other appliance for
the diversion, apportionment, measurement or regulation of water . . . is
also liable in damages to any person injured by such unlawful act.
Id. Likewise, Section 73-1-15 provided:
Whenever any person . . . has a right of way of any established type or title
for any canal or other watercourse it shall be unlawful for any person . . . to
place or maintain in place any obstruction, or change of the water flow by
fence or otherwise, along or across or in such canal or watercourse . . .
without first receiving written permission for the change and providing
gates sufficient for the passage of the owner or owners of such canal or
watercourse. That the vested rights in the established canals and
watercourse shall be protected against all encroachments.... Any person,
partnership, company or corporation violating the provisions of this section
is guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to damages and costs.
Id.4 Randall's actions in destroying the water delivery system violated both of these statutes.
First, Randall violated Section 14 by obliterating the dam that formed the Pond. Second,
Randall violated Section 15 by destroying the delivery system and changing the water flow

4

The Utah State Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-1-14 and 15 in 2005.
Appellant's citations to these statutes are to the prior versions that were in effect at the
time Randall obliterated the water delivery system and White filed his lawsuit.
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without first receiving White's written permission. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized
that "Utah law provides that anyone who obstructs or changes a watercourse without the
permission of the right-of-way owner is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to damages."
Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium Co.. 704 P.2d 573, 578 (Utah 1985). Therefore,
Randall's actions were in clear violation of Utah law.
In summary, the trial court correctly found that White had an easement across
Randall's land.

However, the trial court erred when it considered and relied upon

topographical maps that it located through its own research, and that were not presented at
trial, to craft an alternate water delivery system. If White was entitled to an easement by
implication pursuant to Adamson v. Brockbank. 185 P.2d 264 Utah (1947), then the trial
court should have granted White an easement in the entire water delivery system as it existed
historically. It was legal error for the trial court to exclude the Pond and other aspects of the
historic water delivery system. The trial court's decision therefore should be reversed and
the trial court should be instructed to enter judgment consistent with its initial Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
III.

UTAH LAW ALLOWS FOR A RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS AS AN ELEMENT OF A PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD.
Although there is no applicable contract or statute allowing the recovery of attorney's

fees in this case, Utah law suggests that attorney's fees may be awarded as an element of
punitive damages. The Court should clarify this rule of law prior to remanding this case to
the trial court.
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"Utah adheres to the prevailing common-law rule that attorney fees are not
recoverable in the absence of a contractual or statutory basis." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). However, "[i]t is generally held that
counsel fees and expenses of litigation are to be taken into consideration in some
jurisdictions, when estimating exemplary or punitive damages, to encourage plaintiffs to
bring wrongdoers to trial." 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 608 (2003). Utah is one of those
jurisdictions where attorney's fees and expenses can be taken into consideration when
calculating punitive damages. Several Utah appellate court decisions have suggested that this
is the case. For instance, in Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.. supra, this Court noted that "Utah courts
have also permitted the amount of attorney fees expended to be considered in calculating
punitive damages when punitive damages are warranted." Id. at 966.
In several other cases, the Utah Supreme Court has hinted that attorney's fees may be
recoverable as an element of punitive damages, but those particular cases did not warrant
such an award based on the facts. See Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co.. 660 P.2d 229, 233
(Utah 1983) (reversing an award of attorney's fees as an element of punitive damages on the
basis that punitive damages were not properly awarded in that case); DeBry & Hilton Travel
Servs.. Inc. v. Capitol Intern. Airwavs. Inc.. 583 P.2d 1181,1185 (Utah 1978) ("Counsel fees
. . . can be considered as an element of damages only in those cases in which exemplary
damages are or can be awarded."); Dahl v. Prince. 230 P.2d 328,329 (Utah 1951) (reversing
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a judgment awarding attorney's fees as an element of damages because "there was no basis
for an award of punitive damages.").
While these decisions each suggest that attorney's fees and costs may be recoverable
as an element of punitive damages, they do not contain an affirmative holding to that effect.
Accordingly, the Court should address this issue and clarify in its instructions on remand that
the trial court should award White his attorney's fees and costs as an element of punitive
damages.
White pled a punitive damage claim in his Complaint (R. at 3) and presented evidence
at trial to support the Court's initial finding that Randall's conduct was "wilful and
malicious" (R. at 112).5 In its initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court
awarded White his attorney's fees and costs (R. at 114). Because there was no applicable
contract or statute allowing the recovery of attorney's fees, counsel for White recognized that
the attorney's fees could only be recovered as an element of punitive damages. Therefore,
White requested that the Court amend the Judgment to award him punitive damages in the
amount of $1,000 plus the amount of his attorney's fees (R. at 159-168).6
5

In Falkenburg v. Neff. 269 P. 1008 (Utah 1928), the Utah Supreme Court held
that the evidence in that case supported a punitive damage award where the defendants
had destroyed the plaintiffs' dam and diverting works. See id. at 1011 ("That the
destruction of the diverting works, in the manner and under the circumstances shown by
respondents' evidence, is a sufficient legal basis for awarding exemplary damages is a
proposition too plain for argument.").
6

Although the exact amount of White's attorney's fees was not known at that time,
White suggested that the amount could be incorporated into a supplemental judgment at
the conclusion of the litigation.
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During the April 4, 2005 hearing, counsel for Randall responded to White's request
for attorney's fees and costs by arguing that Utah law does not allow for such a recovery.
Specifically, counsel argued that "our Appellate Courts and our Legislature have never
adopted a rule that if punitive damages are awarded, attorney's fees can be awarded in
connection with that" (R. at 273, p. 75). Following the April 4th hearing, the trial court issued
its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and concluded that "[t]he parties
should be ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs" (R. at 247).
A more appropriate case for awarding punitive damages than the present case would
be hard to find. Randall's conduct was without excuse or reason. The total destruction of
White's water delivery system was of no benefit to him and the injury to White was obvious
and intended. The intended effect was and has been to deprive White of the use and
enjoyment of his water rights since July 2003. That Randall's actions were "willful and
malicious," as stated in the trial court's initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.
at 112), is clear in the record.
The issue of whether attorney's fees and costs can properly be awarded as an element
of a punitive damage award should be clarified by this Court prior to remand. This Court
should affirmatively instruct the trial court that it should award White his attorney's fees and
costs as an element of punitive damages, because punitive damages are warranted.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment should be set aside, and the Court should instruct the trial court to enter
judgment consistent with its initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which ordered
Randall to pay the costs to restore the Pond and water delivery system back to their original
condition. Additionally, the Court should instruct the trial court that the trial court should
award White his attorney's fees and costs as an element of punitive damages.
DATED this 2 f t

day of February, 2006.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

R£ea L. Martineau
/D. Jason Hawkins
'
Attorneys for Appellant

31

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2 f > i y of February, 2006,1 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT LEON J. WHITE
to be mailed to the following:

James G. Clark
LAW OFFICE OF JAMES CLARK
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84606

32

ADDENDUM
A.

The trial court's initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered

on September 14, 2004 (R. at 105-116).
B.

The trial court's initial Judgment entered on September 30, 2004 (R. at

153-57).
C.

The trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

entered on July 26,2005 (R. at 238-247).
D.

The trial court's final Judgment Following Bench Trial entered on

September 19, 2005 (R. at 254-57).
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON J. WHITE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Case No. 030600302
JERRY RANDALL,
Judge David L. Mower
Defendant.

This matter having come on for trial on October 10, 2003, and
on November 26, 2003, before the Honorable David K. Mower, and
plaintiff being present and represented by Reed L. Martineau, and
defendant being present and represented by James G. Clark, and the
Court having heard testimony and having admitted trial exhibits,
and the Court being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In 1988, Kaziah May Jordan Hancock, referred to herein as

"May Jordan" or "Jordan," and her husband purchased approximately

3 8 acres, in two separate parcels, together with 34 shares of stock
in the Indianola Irrigation Company. When Jordan bought the property in 1988, Don Tibbs, a neighbor who had leased the property,
showed her how everything worked and how to bring water from the
pond to the property later purchased by White.1

Jordans built a

residence on the property and resided there until 1997.

During

that period of some 8 years, they used the pond and the ditches to
and from the pond to irrigate the fields formerly owned by Condley
south and west of the present White homesite.
2.

On July 28, 1995, a 16-acre parcel of that property, the

Condley Parcel, and one share of stock in Indianola Irrigation Company were sold by Jordan to Leon White. A second parcel consisting
of approximately 9 acres was sold to White on November 1, 1995,
together with an additional 10 shares of Indianola Irrigation Company stock.
3.

In the spring of 1997 another parcel of that property

including the residence, consisting of approximately 11% acres, was
sold to Randall.
4.

At the time of the sale to White, Jordan showed the prop-

erty to him and explained how she and her husband used the irrigation delivery system to deliver water to the irrigable portion of
1

Jordan testified that the property she sold to White had
been purchased by her in 1988 from Clyde Condley (the "Condley
Parcel") and that the ditch from the pond to and around the base of
the hill below and west of White's home was the only way to get
delivery of water to that land.
-2-

the property purchased by White.
5.

Heavy flooding in the spring and early summer of 1983

caused the pond to overflow and wash out the dike on the west side
of the pond.

The water released by the breach in the dike flowed

directly west to U.S. Highway 89 in a low depression as shown on
trial exhibit 8.
6.

Soon after the rupture of the dam Don Tibbs, a neighbor

who was then leasing the property, rebuilt the dam and enlarged the
pond.

The dam was reconstructed to an elevation of approximately

10-12 feet. It was equipped with a discharge pipe approximately 10
inches in diameter and a control valve.

The reconstruction cost

was paid for in part by the U.S. Soil Conservation Service.
7.

At the same time, Mr. Tibbs enlarged an existing ditch,

originally constructed by the Spencer family many years before,
from the pond to and around the base of the hill below White's
present home.

This ditch carried water to flood irrigate the

approximately 15-acre Condley Parcel that extended from the bottom
of the hill west of and below White's home and adjacent to the
Indianola Road, to the east side of U.S. Highway 89.
8.

That delivery system, including the pond and the ditches

to and from the pond (the "System"), were constructed by Tibbs in
the 1983-1984 period, and remained unchanged to the time the property was purchased by Jordan.

And that System was used continu-

ously by Jordan and then by White unchanged until July 2003 when
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the pond was destroyed by Randall.
9.

At the time of the purchase by White, that System had

been in existence and unchanged for a period of some 10 years. The
System was open, notorious and obvious to persons looking at the
property.
10.

At the time White purchased the property, Jordan assured

him that he would have a permanent easement to use that same
System, including the ditches and the pond located on her reserved
property, to irrigate the White property.
11.

Leon White in the summer of 1995 began his use of that

same System, including the ditches and the pond, to irrigate his
property in the same way Jordan had done.
that use and approved of it.

Jordan was aware of

That same use continued following

Randall's purchase in 1997 and through the 2003 irrigation season.
12.

The pond was built initially for stock watering in the

late 1930s or early 1940s.
13.

In approximately 2001, Randall attempted to change the

course of delivery of White's water around the pond by constructing
a ditch along his east-west fenceline south of the pond.

He told

White he would have to use that new ditch in place of the existing
ditches then in use and that he would no longer allow White to
store water in the pond.

That ditch, however, could not deliver

irrigation water to White's property, which was at a higher level
than the ditch.

In fact, the ditches and the pond as constructed
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by Don Tibbs and as used unchanged by both Jordans and White were
the only means by which the irrigation flow could be delivered to
White's property.

White continued to use the ditches and pond the

same as before and the ditch constructed by Randall was never put
to use.

White's use of the System was reasonably necessary, in

fact essential to his use and enjoyment of his property and his
water rights.
14.

The ditch to the pond as well as the ditch from the pond

to White's property were open and plain to be seen as evidenced by
the following facts:2
2

The extent to which the prior use was or might have been
known to Randall is only one of eight factors to be considered as
bearing on an easement by implication. As set out in Adams on v.
Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264 (Utah 1947) those factors are:
In determining whether the circumstances under which a
conveyance of land is made imply an easement, the following
factors are important:
(a) Whether
conveyee,

the

claimant

is

the

(b)

The terms o the conveyance,

(c)

The consideration given for it.

conveyor

or

the

(d) Whether the claim is made against a simultaneous
conveyee,
(e) The extent of necessity of the easement
claimant,

to the

(f) Whether reciprocal benefits result to the conveyor
and the conveyee,
(g) The manner in which the land was used prior to its
conveyance,
(h) The extent to which the manner of prior use was or
might have been known to the parties.
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a.

The testimony of both Jordan and White was clear and

definite that the System was open, visible, and, in the words
of Jordan, "It was plain as day."
b.

Other witnesses called by Randall were unable to

testify concerning the System for lack of knowledge:
i.

Mr. Spencer did not go on the property or see

the dam, etc., after Tibbs rebuilt the dam and completed
the System but recalled that in the '40s or '50s they had
plowed a ditch around the base of the hill to water two
trees next to the Indianola Road.
ii.

Mr. Bigler was aware Tibbs was working on the

dam but never inspected it because it was beyond the
jurisdiction of the irrigation company.
iii. Mrs. Tibbs, although generally aware of the
reconstruction, paid no attention to the System or its
use by Jordan and White.
c.

Randall testified that in 1997 or 1998 he helped

White clean the ditch that delivered water to the pond.
d.

Randall tried to change the long-established means

of delivery of the water to the pond by a ditch along his
south fence line.

That ditch was never used and, in any

event, could not have delivered water to White's property.

Citing Restatement of the Law of Property, paragraph No. 476, paqe
2977.
-6-

e.

The System had been in existence and continuous use

since 1983 or 1984 without change.
f.

Significantly, Mr. Tibbs, who constructed and used

the System, did not appear to testify at either day of the
trial either in person or by deposition.
g.

Although disputed by Randall, Jordan testified on

direct and on recall that the subject of the pond and White's
right to the use of it and the System came up with Randall
prior to the sale and that she reduced the purchase price at
his request by $5,000 to account for that easement.
h.

In view of the foregoing facts, Randall's testimony

that he was not aware of White's right to use of the System
and Jordan's prior use of the System is not credible. White
had a duty to notice and see what was plain to be seen.
15.

Randall's claim as to destruction of his many chickens

lacks credible support in that:
a.

Except for the one occasion when he told the sheriff

that a dog had his chicken down but not dead, he never called
Whites to advise them of any further problems.
b.

He never called the sheriff as to any further

problems.
c.

He took no photos of any dead birds.

d.

He didn't ever see any other chickens being attacked

or killed.
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e.

He produced no other witnesses to verify his claim.

f.

In view of the foregoing facts, Randall's claim is

unsupported and not credible.
16.

Randall's claim as to the death of his foal lacks cred-

ible support in that:
a.

Neither he nor anyone else witnessed the death of

the foal.
b.

No tests were made to determine the cause of the

foal's death.
c.

The dog claimed to have caused the problem was in

the Whites' pasture with them at the time the supposed attack
by dog took place.
d.

In view of the foregoing facts, Randall's claim has

not been established by a preponderance of the evidence.
17.

Randall's conduct by engaging in self-help in destroying

the pond, rendering the entire System unusable and leaving White
with no means to use and enjoy his property and water rights was
without right and was willful and malicious as shown by the
following facts:
a.

His conduct in attempting to force White to abandon

his right to use the System and to use a ditch constructed by
him along his south fenceline which could not deliver White's
water to his property, and which White would not agree to;

-8-

b.

His conduct toward White in locking the valve to the

pond ;
c.

His conduct toward White and his young son in name

calling and inappropriate and wholly unsupported claims that
White or his son had shot at him;
d.

His inappropriate and careless threat to meet White

with a gun when in fact no shots had been fired at him;
e.

His statement that he would no longer store White's

water in his pond;
f.

His destruction of the dam and the pond;

g.

His conceded conduct in killing not one or two, but

an inordinate number of dogs belonging to White and his neighbors and his announced intention to continue to do so; and
h.

His careless, unsupported and inappropriate claims

made in this suit that White or his family had shot at him,
which was inconsistent with his prior confrontation with 17year-old Taylor White with the charge that it was the boy who
shot at him and White's explanation that neither he nor his
son had even been in the area when the shots were supposedly
fired.3
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

White holds a valid easement for the use and enjoyment of

the System across Randall's property for the conveyance, storage
3

Adamson v. Brockbank, supra, at p. 278.
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and delivery of his water rights as heretofore used and enjoyed by
Jordan and by him.
2.

Randall had and has no right to obstruct or change the

System "without first receiving written permission for the change"
from White. U.C.A. § 73-1-15 (1953) . No such permission was ever
requested or received.
3.

Randall is charged with notice and knowledge of the

System and White's right to the use and enjoyment thereof as
heretofore enj oyed.
4.

Randall is not entitled to recover for his alleged loss

of a foal or chickens.
5.

Randall is obligated to pay the cost of restoration of

the pond and the System to their condition at the time they were
destroyed and/or rendered useless.
6.

White is entitled to an order enjoining Randall from

threatening bodily harm to White or other members of his family.
7.

White is entitled to recover his costs, including reason-

able attorney's fees incurred herein.
DATED this

C$L

day of-Ma^eir, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Service
Reed L. Martineau states:
That he is attorney for plaintiff herein; that she served the
attached proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case
No. 030600302, Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete County, State
of Utah, upon the following parties by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope to:
Mr. James G. Clark
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84606
Attorneys for Defendant
and causing the same to be hand delivered on the 5th day of
March, 2004.

Reed L. Martineau
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON J. WHITE,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs

-

Case No. 030600302

JERRY RANDALL,

Judge David L. Mower

Defendant.

This

action

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Court

sitting

without a jury beginning on October 10, 2003, and concluding on
November 26, 2 0 03, before the Honorable David K. Mower.

The Court

now having reviewed the file, and having listened to the record
of the testimony of the witnesses and reviewed the exhibits, and
having considered the law applicable to this matter, and the Court
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein,
and good cause appearing therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED and judgment is
hereby entered against defendant Jerry Randall and in favor of
plaintiff Leon J. White as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Leon J. White holds a valid easement for the

use and enjoyment of the delivery system, including the pond and
the ditches to and from the pond, as used and enjoyed previously
by Kaziah May Jordan Hancock and by Leon J. White, without change,
for the delivery of his water rights, until July 2003 when the pond
was destroyed by Jerry Randall.
2.
changing

Defendant

Jerry Randall's conduct

the

delivery

water

in obstructing and

system was without

permission of

Leon J. White, which permission was never requested or received.
3.

Defendant Jerry Randall's conduct in destroying the pond,

rendering the entire water delivery system unusable and leaving
plaintiff Leon J. White with no means to use and enjoy his property
and water rights was without right and was willful and malicious.
4.

Defendant Jerry Randall is not entitled to recover for

his alleged loss of a foal or chickens.
5.

Defendant Jerry Randall is obligated to pay to Leon J.

White the cost of restoration of the ponds and the water delivery
system to their condition at the time they were destroyed and/or
render useless.
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6.

Defendant Jerry Randall is hereby enjoined from threat-

ening or causing bodily harm to Leon J. White or other members of
his family.
7.

Leon J. White is entitled to recover from Jerry Randall

his costs, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein.

VL

DATED AND ENTERED this

day of September, 2004

BY THE COURT:

David ,K^ Mower, District Court Judge
L.

Approved as to form:
JAMES G. CLARK

Counsel for Defendant
Date

N:\21878\1\JUDGMENT
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Certificate of Service
Alison M. Wood states:
That she is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, attorneys for plaintiff herein; that she served the
attached proposed JUDGMENT, Case No. 030600302, Sixth Judicial
District Court, Sanpete County, State of Utah, upon the following
parties by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
to:
Mr. James G. Clark
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84 606
Attorneys for Defendant
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage pre-paid,
on the 14th day of September, 2004.

Alison M. Wood

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 030600302 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

3d

day of

NAME
JAMES G CLARK
ATTORNEY DEF
60 E 100 S #100
PROVO, UT 84606-4652
REED L. MARTINEAU
ATTORNEY PLA
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH
FLOOR
P.O. BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84110-0000
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DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY-^UTAH
160 NORTH MAIN
MANTI, UTAH 84642
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135
i

LEON J.WHITE,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 030600302

vs.

Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER

JERRY RANDALL,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Trial was held in this case on October 9, 2003 and November 26, 2003 in Manti, Utah.
The parties were present with their respective lawyers, Mr. Martineau for the plaintiff and Mr.
Clark for the defendant. Witnesses testified, namely: Leon White, Kaziah May Hancock, Teesha
Gonzalez, Taylor White, Samuel Gonzalez, Gary Larsen, Kent Spencer, Cheryl Tibbs, John
Bigler, Norma Bigler, Ricky AUshouse, Jerry Randall, Pamela Randall, and John R. LaChance.
The case was taken under advisement. Unfortunately there was an unintentional delay in
issuing a decision. The Court accepted the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
submitted by the plaintiff on September 14, 2004. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to
alter, amend, or supplement the findings of fact and conclusions of law arguing that they were
not in harmony with the findings at the end of trial on November 26, 2003. The Court granted

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case number 030600302, Page -2that motion following oral argument on April 4, 2005 but took the case under advisement as to
how the findings of fact and conclusions of law would be amended. The Court has reviewed the
trial transcripts and now issues the following decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

There is a place called Indianola, Utah. It is
shown on the accompanying map.

2.

It is in northern Sanpete County. The main f
land use is agricultural. Water flows from \y
east to west and from south to north.

3.

The United States Geologic Survey
publishes maps. The maps used here are
portions of two USGS 7-1/2-minute
quadrangle maps which have been "stitched" together to make a single map. USGS 7-1/2minute maps contain contour lines and locations of water sources, courses and storage
facilities, both natural and man-made. The maps used here were not presented by the
parties. They are part of my own mapping software. I used the maps to help familiarize
myself with the area. I showed the maps to counsel during oral argument on April 4,
2005.

4.

Each 7-1/2-minute map has a title which is shown on the map itself. The title portion of

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case number 030600302, Page -3the two maps used here shows:

INDIANOLA, UTAH
*

N394S—W11122.5/7.5

highlighting the contour lines.
a.

The green line represents an
elevation of 5,960 feet above sea
level;

b.

The red line, 5,940 feet; and

c.

The blue line, 5,920 feet.

There is a pond which is of particular
interest in this case. It is highlighted in blue L
on this map.
a.

The pond was either natural or of
long-ago construction.

b.

Water in the pond came from
nearby springs and seeps.

c.

Before 1987 there were no water
outflow controls on the pond.

3 6 * « A N T » O U ! N PEAK .3" OUAORA.NOUE

1967

1979

AMS 3763 IV SW SERIES V897

DM*. 3663 I SE—83RIES VB»?

#4.
I have modified the above map by

SPENCER CANYON, UTAH
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There is a person named Kaziah May Hancock. She has also been known as Kaziah May
Jordan, Kaziah Jordan and May Jordan.
a.

She is the immediate predecessor in interest to the parties in this case

b.

Her immediate predecessor, one Spencer, was an absentee owner who leased the
land for many years to a relative, one Tibbs, who in 1987 expanded the pond and
installed a head gate and a valve to control the outflow of water.

c.

The legal description of a portion of
her land is shown in green on this
map. This legal description is found
in trial exhibit number 17.

d.

The pond is within this legal
description.

e.

Neither Tibbs, nor Spencer, nor
Hancock ever owned any rights to
divert or store water. All such rights were and are owned by the Indianola
Irrigation Company and made available to its stockholders.

f.

No easements are shown in any of the documents presented in Court.

g.

Tibbs' lease expired when Spencer sold to Hancock in 1988. Thereafter Hancock
had no contact with Tibbs.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case number 030600302, Page -5h.
8.

Hancock assumed that the water in the pond was available to use as she saw fit.

In 1995 the plaintiff, Mr. White, acquired some land.
a.

There were two deeds, each from Ms. Hancock,
i.

A warranty deed dated July
28, 1995 conveyed the
property in the western of
the two parcels shown on the
map to Mr. White. The legal
description from this deed
describes a parcel of land
plus these two items: "Also
r

llrt

#8. a. I. and 8. a. n.

including: An existing well in the Northeast corner of the above described
property and all water rights pertaining to Utah State Engineer application
#A-17724 (51-6583) for said well. Also including: One (1) Share of the
Indianola Irrigation Company."
ii.

The second deed was not presented in Court. The legal description of the
eastern parcel was obtained from a quit-claim deed dated May 5, 1998
from the Whites to themselves as joint tenants.

b.

Neither deed transferred easements.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case number 030600302, Page -6c.

Ms. Hancock told Mr. White that he could trespass on her land in order to open
the valve at the pond and divert water to the parcels she sold to him.

9.

In 1996 the defendant, Mr. Randall, acquired
land from Ms. Hancock. This map shows
what he acquired.

10.

Here is a map showing the pond, the
contour lines, and the property owned by

1\

White and Randall.

#10.
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Between 1995 and 1996 White and Hancock were neighbors.
a.

White moved a mobile home onto his west parcel (next to the one later sold to
Randall).

12.

b.

Hancock lived in the home on the parcel that she later sold to Randall.

c.

White used water from the pond to flood irrigate his eastern-most parcel.

The only way water can possibly flow from the pond onto the NE corner of White's
property is for it flow below the 5,940 contour line and above the 5,920 contour line.
a.

These contour lines are very close together in the vicinity of the residences on the
parties.

b.

i.

The White home is just below the 5,920-foot contour line.

ii.

The Randall home is on a hill just above the 5,940-foot contour line.

Water released through the valve at the pond would flow toward the northeast
corner of Mr. White's property.

c.

May Hancock used water from the pond for that very purpose during the time that
she owned all the property. However, when she released water from the pond she
took care not to drain it; in fact, she took care to maintain parity between the water
inflow and outflow rates.

13.

The Indianola Irrigation Company owns water rights and supplies water to its
stockholders.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case number 030600302, Page -8-

14.

a.

Its distribution system consists of pipelines, valves, ditches and head gates.

b.

Most of the stockholders receive water through the pipelines.

c.

There is a ditch that will transport irrigation-company-water into the pond.

Mr. White is a stockholder in the Indianola Irrigation Company. His stock certificates
were issued on July 27,1995 and March 2, 1996.

15.

16.

White continued to use the water from the pond after he and Randall became neighbors.
a.

He trespassed on Randall's land to operate the water-flow controls.

b.

He trespassed to clean and maintain the ditch.

Randall became convinced that White had no right to tresspass nor to release water from
the pond.
a.

He chained and locked the water-flow controls.

b.

He confronted Mr. White and challenged his claimed right to trespass and to
remove water from the pond.

c.
17.

Eventually he caused the pond to be removed.

Mr. White has asked the Court to order the restoration of the pond. However, he
presented no evidence about the cost to do so, nor any evidence about the dimensions of
the pond.

18.

It should be physically and geographically possible for water to flow across Mr. Randall's
property and onto Mr. White's property.
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In 1947 the Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion in the case of Adamson v. Brockbank.
The case is reported at 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264.

20.

The definition of a warranty deed is found in statutory law, namely, Section 57-1-12,
Utah Code, which provides, in part, as follows:
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance ... of... all the appurtenances ....

21.

As I read Adamson v. Brockbank, a warranty deed can be construed to convey an
easement, even when the deed contains no easement description, because an easement is
an appurtenance.

22.

Mr. Randall owned chickens.

23.

The chickens were killed by dogs owned by or under the control of Mr. White.

24.

The value of the chickens is $198.00.

25.

Mr. Randall owned a very young horse called a foal.

26.

It was killed by a dog owned by or under the control of Mr. White.

27.

No evidence was presented about the value of the foal on the date of death.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A.

Mr. White should be awarded a judgment granting him an easement across Mr. Randall's
land.
1.

The easement will be exactly equal in both length and width to the existing ditch
which conveyed water both to and from the now non-existent pond.
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The ditch will be reasonably connected in the space where the pond once was.

3.

The easement will include the right to trespass on Mr. Randall's land for
reasonable ditch maintenance and for controlling the flow of water.

B.

Mr. Randall should be awarded judgment against Mr. White for $198.00.

C.

The parties should be ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs.

D.

The parties should be advised that no water rights of any kind are included in this order.

Mr. Clark is directed to draft an appropriate judgment and to submit it for execution by
following the procedure set forth in Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
t
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Certificate of Notification
On z^jAjMr<2sl , 2005, a copy of the above Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law was sent as follows:
Mr. Reed Martineau
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

Mr. James G. Clark
96 East 100 South
Provo, UT 84606
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JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637
Attorney for
43 East 200 North
Provo, UT 84606
Telephone: (801) 375-1717
Facsimile: (801)375-1172

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON J. WHITE,
Petitioner,
vs.

])
>
]

JUDGEMENT FOLLOWING BENCH
TRIAL

]

JERRY RANDALL,
Respondent.

)> Civil No. 030600302
1 Judge: David L. Mower
]

The Above entitled matter came on before the Court for trial on October 9,2003 and
November 26,2003 in the above entitled Court. The parties were present and represented by
their respective attorneys. The Court previously adopted proposed finding of fact and
conclusions of law submitted by the Plaintiff on September 14,2004. Defendant filed a timely
motion to alter, amend, or clarify and to set aside the prior judgement which was entered. On
April 4,2005 the Court heard oral arguments on the motion and granted the motion and tot^
under advisement the appropriatefindings,conclusion and judgement to be entered.

On July 21, 2005, the Court made and entered its amended Findings of Fact and
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Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefore, now makes and enters the following
judgement.
JUDGEMENT:
1.

Plaintiffs claim for a judgement by implication in a irrigation ditch running

through and across the Randall property is granted. The easement will be exactly equal in length,
width, and depth to the existing dilch which conveyed water both to and from the now nonexistent pond*
2.

The irrigation ditch will heraasonablelyconnected between the area where it

entered the pond and it exited the pond with sufficient width, depth and length to allow it to
convey irrigation water across the real property previously occupied by the pond.
3.

The ditch will constitute an easement for irrigation purposes only, and shall

include a right of access by Mr. White including the right to trespass on Mr. Randall's land for
reasonable ditch maintenance and for controlling the flow of water.
4.

That Defendant Jerry Randall is awarded judgement against Mr, White for $ 198

for the value of domestic foul killed by Mr, Whites' dog or dogs.
5.

That each of the parties shall pay their own attorneys fees and bear their own

6.

No water rights of any kind arc included in this order.

7.

That the Court has carefully considered the additional claims and causes of action

costs.

2
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of the parties, finds them to be without merit, and orders them dismissed with no cause for
action.
DATED AND SIGNED this J^l_ day of September, 2005,
BY THE COURT:

Hun. David L, Mower
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Reed L< Martineau
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, attorney for the Plaintiff, will submit the
above and foregoing,, to a District Court Judge, upon the expiration offive(5) days from the date
of this Notice, plus tliree (3) days for mailing, unless written objection isfiledprior to thaUjme,
pursuant to Rule 7(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED AND SIGNED this \V " day of August, 2005.

^
r

t

J A M ^ G . CLARK
Jrney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
as follows:
/
^ mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing first class postage prepaid and
addressed as follows; or
Jmnd-dclivcrcd to the following: or
r sent by facsimile to the following:
Reed L. Martineau
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
PO BOX 45000
S.L.CUT. 84145
DATED AND SIGNED this _/£. day of August, 2005.
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